Bartell-George-Edward-Reginald

To honour those who served their country

“In this their finest hour”

5932904

Private

George Edward Reginald Bartell Known as Ted

1920/03/12 - Born Isleham, Ely, Cambridgeshire

Son of Edward and Mary Amelia Bartell

Educated Burn Fen School

Occupation:- Ted worked on the farm with his family in Isleham Bank, Soham

Cambridgeshire Regiment

2nd Battalion

18th Division

Service

Originally formed in June, 1939, the 2nd Battalion finally became a separate entity when embodied on 1st September of that year. It was not, of course, purely a battalion of new recruits, for with the reorganisation of the Regiment on a geographical basis those companies of the 1st Battalion which existed in the northern half of the county were transferred over to the 2nd Battalion.

On the outbreak of war, Battalion H.Q. moved from Cambridge and joined Headquarters Company and ‘C’ Company at Wisbech; ‘A’ Company was at March and ‘B’ Company at Ely and ‘D’ at Charteris.

To begin with, shortage of equipment, arms, clothing and boots, with a lack of instructors, considerably hampered the companies in their efforts to turn themselves into full-time soldiers, but the task was tackled with great keenness by everyone and the fullest use made of the limited instruction available.

On November 2nd the Battalion concentrated for the first time as a complete unit at Melton Constable in Norfolk, and was shortly afterwards transferred to 53 Infantry Brigade, 18th Division, thus parting company with the 1st Battalion which remained 55 Infantry Brigade. At the end of the month a further move took place to Holt , where companies were assigned a variety of billets, including a condemned school and a disused chapel. Here the first Christmas of the war was spent , chiefly memorable for the generous gifts of cigarettes , woollen comforts and luxuries sent by the people of Cambridgeshire, and also for a large scale influenza epidemic!

In January 1940, The Battalion marched to a new station at Stiffkey , on the coast, which being a hutted summer camp by design, received the full benefit of the extremely severe weather of that winter; the camp was on the edge of the salt marshes and everything froze solid. Heavy snowfalls disrupted communications throughout the district, and companies were employed in clearing roads and digging out railway trains until better weather enabled a start to be made on platoon and company training. Guards were also supplied to various V.I.P’s in the neighbourhood.

In the meanwhile a cadre of officers and N.C.O’s was sent from the Battalion at Wisbech, who were drafted to the Battalion as soon as their primary training was completed; these new drafts were of first class material and were badly needed to fill the gaps caused by the withdrawal of ‘category’ men.

With the spring, training began to get under way, but the invasion of the Low Countries resulted in the Battalion being allotted an operational role and other considerations had to be shelved in a hurry. The unit took over defence of a sector of coast and responsibility for a number of airfields as well. The size of the task necessitated the dispersal of companies over an enormously large area, and like the rest of the small garrison of Britain at the time the 2nd Battalion found itself holding the equivalent of a Divisional front, ‘A’ and ‘B’ held the coast between Salthouse and Cley, with Battalion H.Q. and H.Q. Company behind them, while “C” was at Fakenham, and “D” distributed between King’s Lynn, Docking, and Hunstanton. It took all day to distribute mail round the whole unit. At this time a Mobile Group was formed within the Battalion for patrol and airfield assistance duties, and they were really the only people who got any training at all, the remainder spent every day and many moonlit nights furiously digging and erecting defences to the detriment of seaside amenities.

In July the Battalion moved back into Brigade Reserve, and was at last able to get down to training again while stationed at Melton Park, and later in Gresham’s School, Holt. While at the latter station it was inspected by the Prime Minister, who appeared to be satisfied with it’s appearance.

While in reserve, the unit held a mobile counter attack role and was allotted a number of double decker buses for this purpose. In the numerous exercises which took place along the coast, many headaches were caused by the problem of how to camouflage these enormous Eastern Counties vehicles in flaming scarlet, the drivers also had a peculiar habit of disappearing before a practice alarm.

In August, coast defences were again taken over, this time at Sheringham and West Runton, here the Battalion sustained its first air attack, but suffered no causalities, though some were rudely awakened from their Sunday afternoon siesta. Finally the defensive role ceased , and it was moved inland to Houghton Hall, Raynham and nearby villages, where the second Christmas was spent in greater comfort.

With the move of the Division to Scotland early in January 1941, the 2nd Battalion was sent to Dumfries. It was expected that orders would be given to prepare for service overseas, but these failed to materialise and the unit settled down to intensive company and battalion training over new and formidable country, followed by Higher Formation exercises in severe weather. Considerable hospitality was shown by Provost and citizens of Dumfries and the Battalion came into contact with the Free Norwegian Army, stationed in the same town, Unfortunately, the Norwegians had more money, and this gave them an unfair advantage in the eyes of the local maidens.

In April the Division moved down into Western Command, and the 2nd Battalion took up quarters in Crewe Hall, Cheshire. The summer was principally occupied by Divisional exercises carried out over large distances into Lancashire and Yorkshire. In addition, time was found for field firing on Ruabon Mountain in Wales and company camps at Plas Power, near Wrexham. In August, companies were dispatched to carry out defensive wiring tasks on the north Wales coast and to help with the harvest in Leicestershire. Assistance was also given in the evenings to local Home Guard units in Crewe, and large scale co-operation exercises with Home Guard, Civil Defence and other units took place in Crewe, Birmingham, and Carlisle.

King George Inspecting the 2nd Cambridgeshires

Ted was in the guard of honour

In October, orders were at last received to prepare for foreign service, and on completion of mobilization the Battalion was inspected by H.M. the King in the grounds of Crewe Hall. Last minute were also made by the Bishop of Ely and the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, who brought with him a personal message from the C.I.G.S.

On October 31st the Battalion sailed from Gourock in the Polish Free State vessel, M.V.Sobieski and joined the 18th Division convoy off the Irish coast.

On arrival at Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Battalion re-embarked in the U.S.S. Mount Vernon, and began the long voyage to Capetown.

Convoy William Sail 12X continued with six American troopships, two cruisers, eight destroyers and the aircraft carrier Ranger, the Convoy William Sail 12X was under way, destination still unknown.

Convoy William Sail 12X

Above Photo supplied by the late Maurice Rooney

Detailed Account by Thomas M. Allison

A reproduction of an account by Thomas M. Allison who is understood to be serving as an American Naval officer in the convoy.

Aircraft

Vought SB 2U Vindicator Scout Bomber - USS Ranger which was flying an Anti Submarine patrol over the convoy.

Ships Front Line, Top to Bottom:-

USS West Point - USS Mount Vernon - USS Wakefield - USS Quincy (Heavy Cruiser)

Ships Back Line Top to Bottom:-

USAT Leonard Wood - USS Vincennes (Heavy Cruiser) - USS Joseph T Dickman

The convoy passed through the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico and St Domingo.

Arrived at Trinidad 17th November in glorious sunshine so troops changed to tropical kit, but no shore-leave, left Trinidad after two days of taking on supplies. The equator was crossed soon after leaving Trinidad on the 24th, there was a crossing the line ceremony.

After a month the convoy arrived at Cape Town, and soon after on the 8th December news reached the regiment that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbour and Malaya.

Britain and America were now at war with Japan and the rumours were that the convoy was now heading for the Far East and not the Middle East as first thought.

On January 13th the Mount Vernon arrived at Singapore in the middle of an air raid, for which the ship was meant to be the target; but a sudden squall of heavy rain and mist providentially concealed the vessel and the aircraft unloaded its bombs somewhere else instead. In heavy rain the Battalion disembarked and proceeded to a makeshift camp on the Bukit Timah racecourse, which consisted largely of mud, expecting to spend some weeks reorganizing and training after a long voyage. However, owing to the critical situation on the mainland, these illusions were rudely shattered and the unit was rather unceremoniously pushed into battle on the 16th, without having time to unpack. It was attached to 15th Indian Brigade and dispatched to Batu Pahat in north Johore to relieve a composite Leicester-Surrey Battalion (the ‘British Battalion’) and prevent the enemy occupying the town and its airfield. Within a few hours of arrival on the mainland, the first causalities were sustained from dive bombing attacks.

Malayan Action

The last few days in Batu Pahat were spent in active patrolling, contact was soon made with parties of enemy who had landed on the west coast behind Battalion positions and were threatening communications. Before long, many enemy forces driving south from Muar had built up a considerable force round Batu Pahat on the north of the river and began to attempt to break into the town. The British Battalion was brought back from reserve to reinforce the small garrison of the town which consisted of the 2nd Battalion, a company of the Malay Regiment and a battery of the 155 Field Regiment. Even with the addition of the British Battalion it was a very small force to hold a place of the size of Batu Pahat and meet attacks from every direction. In the meanwhile, the enemy continued to land troops behind the defence line, and before long the defenders found it necessary to form a complete circle, which perforce was only thinly held in parts. The Japanese attacked the troop positions of the Field Regiment, taking them by surprise; a company each from the British Battalion and the 2nd Battalion had to be sent to disperse the enemy and rescue the guns. This done with the loss of one gun only.

Having failed in their attempts to take the town by direct frontal attack, the enemy next sent out a flanking force to work round to the South-East and cut the Ayer Hitam road, the principal line of communication with the rear. They succeeded in doing this on the 22nd, ambushing part of the 2nd Battalion’s ‘B’ echelon and destroying a number of vehicles. The R.Q.M.S. who was in charge of this convoy was wounded, but managed to escape from the trap with two of his trucks. From this day onwards, no further food or ammunition could be delivered to the Batu Pahat and life became rather austere.

The enemy now began to feel their way towards the town by the Yong Peng road, after crossing the river some miles outside the defence perimeter. The garrison was by now so hard pressed for men that this road could not be effectively patrolled so far from the main defences, since all available reserves were in daily use attacking enemy infiltration parties nearer to the town itself. But though the Japanese were thus able to effect a crossing of the river, they soon ran against ‘A’ Company’s positions astride the North-Eastern entrance to Batu Pahat. They were promptly driven back into cover each time they tried to break through. Similar attempts to cross the Muar Road Ferry in the harbour area of the town were held by ‘B’ and ‘C’companies with the assistance of the gunners.

The last remaining line of communication with the besieged garrison was the coast road to Benut; but unprotected vehicles could not be sent up by this route since enemy landing parties some miles to the south were known to have reached the road and prepared blocks in places.

On the 23rd, orders were received by wireless for a withdrawal from Batu Pahat to a position some mile down this road, where it was intended that the garrison should halt and fight a delaying action to cover the establishment of a further defence line through Benut. Soon after nightfall the complete force broke off action and withdrew from the town without difficulty; the Brigade formed up on the coast road with its vehicles and began the march south, headed by the last armoured cars remaining to it, and with its guns disposed in the column.

No sooner had the move commenced than a further signal was received cancelling the withdrawal order and ordering the force to reoccupy the town, and hold it for a further 48 hours to enable certain British units on the east coast to be extricated first. It is profitless to question why and how mistakes such as this are made, from a wider point of view it may be but a small error and unimportant, but to the garrison of Batu Pahat it was an extremely serious matter. Had no withdrawal order been given in the first place, the town could have been held indefinitely without any trouble, since the defenders were well placed in carefully chosen positions on which the enemy had made little or no impression as yet, now however they had in pursuance of orders withdrawn from these positions which thus fell to the enemy without any necessity of fighting for them. The garrison had thus to recapture Batu Pahat by force before it could be held for a further period, and the enemy had now all the best positions in town.

The reoccupation of the town was effected by night attack, delivered by the 2nd Battalion with the assistance of two companies of the 5th Norfolks, which with their Battalion H.Q. had been sent up to reinforce the Brigade just before the coast road became impassable. The attack was successful, though the enemy held on grimly to hill 127, an important feature, and were only dislodged from this after a series of company assaults in the course of which ‘B’ company commander Captain Cutlack was mortally wounded, and a number of officers and other ranks killed and wounded.

Throughout 24th, ,the Japanese made a sustained effort to retake the Batu Pahat and pressed heavily on the defenders from all sides, the brunt of these attacks were borne by the 2nd Battalion and causalities began to mount up. Street fighting developed in several quarters of the town and confused close-quarter actions prevented the use of artillery to support the hard pressed infantry; but the Battalion mortars were in constant demand. In the course of the day ‘A’ company captured an enemy infantry gun.

On the night of the 25th the Batu Pahat force, having fulfilled the demand made upon them, it finally withdrew down the coast road to the village of Sengarang where it found that the last way out of the trap had been already blocked and the force was surrounded. An enemy landing force had erected blocks across the road and prepared strong positions to prevent a break out.

From dawn on the 26th until 1630 hours in the afternoon continual attacks were launched against these blocks in the hope of being able to clear the road to allow the ambulances and other vehicles of the Brigade to pass through, but in vain. Once again, the brunt of this action was borne by the 2nd Battalion, and every man was thrown into the fight, including cooks, drivers, signallers and batmen, the opening of the road was a matter of desperate necessity, for the Brigade was still carrying with it the accumulated causalities of the last four days’ fighting in the town, for whom there was no chance of evacuation to hospital.

The enemy positions were well chosen, the only way of attack lay over marshy ground, thickly wooded, with every clearing covered by both light and heavy automatic weapons. By reason of the limited visibility in this type of country the use of artillery to support the attacks was quite useless and even mortars were employed with difficulty. Up to their knees in mud and water, and hampered by the thick vegetation the companies struggled to reach their objectives, suffering heavy casualties from concealed weapons of the enemy, destroying one post after another only to find that the Japanese position was planned in great depth, with every position covered by another. While the battle was in progress, the guns in the village itself were constantly attacked by Japanese aircraft and threatened by infiltration parties who closed in on the houses, armed with machine guns and mortars. Behind the Post Office, the Field Ambulance staff worked under great difficulties, being continually under fire.

When finally it was found to be impossible to open the road for the passage of vehicles (there were found no fewer than six blocks and ambushes between Senggarang and Ringit) the Brigade Commander gave orders to destroy all guns and transport and to attempt to break out through the jungle and link up with the nearest British forces, who were believed to be at Ringit or Benut. A bitter decision had to be made, the wounded as were too ill to be moved were left in the village under the care of two doctors of the 168 Field Ambulance. When the 2nd Battalion Padre heard of this he elected to stay with them and share their fate.

When the break-out order was given at Senggarang, the Battalion was widely deployed amongst the swamps on both sides of the roads with every man in action. As a natural result, it was impossible to collect the scattered sub-units into a complete Battalion in the time given in the order; however, in companies, platoons, sections and groups of every size and sort, under their respective officers and N.C.O’s, the great majority of the Battalion managed somehow to break out of the enemy ring and make their way back to Singapore, 70 mile distant.

The stories of the adventures of the parties who found themselves alone in the jungle, desperately weary and hungry, hampered with many walking wounded in need of assistance, and constantly harried by enemy ambushes on the few practicable tracks and river crossings, would alone be sufficient to fill a book. One can only say that by the qualities of great endurance, faith and unconquerable cheerfulness these men won through; mud-covered, exhausted, their clothing in rags they came back, their weapons in their hands, the strong helping the weak. Some marched through swamp and jungle till they contacted British units in Benut or south of that town, others found sampans and paddled down the coast, while a large group of 9 officers and 400 men were taken off by naval craft from a fishing village on the coast.

All those who escaped were sent to Singapore in the hope that there would be sufficient survivors to reorganise as a Battalion again.

But there were many who did not come back, and these were killed or captured in the trap or succumbed to their wounds and exhaustion in the mud of the mangrove swamps.

Singapore 1942

Map Supplied by Tim Lloyds

As the survivors returned, the Battalion was able to reorganise and re-equip at a temporary camp on Serangoon Road outside Singapore. As the days went by and more and more of the ‘missing’ turned up, each with stories of wild adventures to tell, the spirits of all ranks rose high and the Battalion had it’s tail up as never before.

The rest of the Division had now arrived on the Island and contact was made with the1st Battalion again. But this rest period lasted a bare five days, after which the unit found itself once more in the line, taking over a sector of coast to the east of the naval base. Here there was a complete lack of any sort of defence works, and much digging and wiring was involved, principally by night and often under shellfire from the enemy batteries across the Straits, any movement by day drew artillery and mortar attention. Here the Battalion returned to 53 Infantry Brigade. Air attacks increased in intensity daily.

Shortly afterwards, as a result of the Japanese landings on the west coast of the Island, the 53 Infantry Brigade was ordered to carry out a withdrawal in stages to the south, to conform with the movement of the left of the general line. This operation was successfully concluded although at one time the enemy cut the road behind the Brigade, and nearly caused a second Senggarang. Finally positions were taken up on the evening of 13th February to the north of Braddell Road, but owing to darkness the positions could not be thoroughly reconnoitred the same evening and information of the positions of other units were scanty. The same evening, the C.O. with a small party of officers and other ranks of the Battalion was ordered away from the Island on an official ‘escape’ party, and in spite of his forceful protests to Brigade was compelled to leave his Battalion. Major Stephen took over command.

Soon after midnight, the enemy attacked the Battalion line in several places, and a force which outflanked the Brigade came in from the left and assaulted Battalion H.Q., which though mustering only 15 all ranks, fought back stoutly and thus contained a complete company on its own. Confused and bitter fighting ensued in the darkness, and the Battalion found itself assaulted from front, flanks and rear. The C.C. was killed while manning an L.M.G., and the Adjutant with several of the Battalion H.Q. met their deaths in a gallant attempt to drive back the enemy with the bayonet. All communications were cut, and part of the defence line was temporarily overrun, but Major P.T. Howard took command of the Battalion, and at dawn the line was reformed and gaps closed; the enemy withdrew into cover and seemed to have exhausted his strength for the time being.

The following night further attempts were made by strong enemy patrols to find a weak spot in the defences, but these were countered and the line held. Throughout the 15th the Battalion continued to hold its ground though its left flank was now in danger and communication with the rear was no longer possible.

In the late afternoon the Brigade Commander came in person to deliver the order to cease fire, lest this be disbelieved.

1942/02/15 - Singapore Surrendered

1942/05/05 - WO 417/42, Casualty List No. 815. Reported ‘Missing’.

1943/09/09 - WO 417/65, Casualty List No. 1234. Previously posted Missing, Casualty List No. 815, 15/02/1942. Now Reported a ‘Prisoner of War’.

Japanese PoW

1942/02/15 - Captured Singapore

PoW No. M-444

Japanese Index Card - Side One

Japanese Index Card - Side Two

1942/10/22 - Transported overland to Thailand with Sime Road Party, train 4

16th train to Thailand.

Work Group 2

New PoW No, II 1957

Thailand Camps:-

Bang Pong - Malaria

Chungkai, 60 Km from Nong Pladuk

Ban Khao - Malaria, 87 Km from Nong Pladuk

Wang Pho (Wampo), 111 Km from Nong Pladuk

Tha Sao Hospital, 125 Km from Nong Pladuk

1943/03/02 - Tha Khanun, 222 Km from Nong Pladuk

1943/06/01 - Tha Makham Hospital, 56.6 Km from Nong Pladuk

1943/10/25 - Rail lines from Thailand and Burma joined near Konkoita

1944/09/18 - Linsen Tree Camp, 202.5 Km from Nong Pladuk

Work included Cutting down trees for the wood

New PoW No. II 2579

Leaflet Dropped from a plane, after 1945/08/15

1945/08/30 - Liberated Linsen Camp

Liberation Questionnaire filled in by Ted after being liberated

Repatriated

Flown to Rangoon, Burma

SS Ormonde

1945/09/26 - Departed Rangoon, Burma

1945/10/02 - Ceylon

Group photo taken at Ceylon

Hank Ramsey, Arthur Willies, Bill Sopper, Ted Bartell

1945/10/12 - Suez Canal

Port Said

Gibraltar

1945/10/22 - Arrive Southampton

1945/10/24 - WO417/98, Casualty List No. 1892. Previously reported on Casualty List No. 1234 as Prisoner of War now Not Prisoner of War. Previous Theatre of War, Malaya.